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and	 epistemic	 community	 in	 judging	what	 is	 an	 “exemplary”	
evaluation,	 by	 examining	 the	 case	 of	 an	 evaluation	 that	was	
considered	 exemplary	 by	 professional	 program	 evaluators,	










Research	 Design:	 	 This	 is	 a	 case	 study	 that	 combines	
participatory	action	research	and	historical	analysis.		
	
Data	 Collection	 and	 Analysis:	 The	 study	 is	 based	 on	 the	


































The 2015 Annual Conference of the American 
Evaluation Association was dedicated to 
exemplary evaluation. But who decides which 
evaluations are exemplary? And based on what 
criteria and standards?  
Based on years of evaluation experience and 
professional aspirations for the field, program 
evaluators have reached broad agreement on 
principles for planning and conducting evaluations 
and on standards for judging their quality. As 
members of professional evaluation associations, 
we often assume that following our guiding 
principles and program evaluation standards will 
lead to evaluations that intended users will view as 
credible and useful. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that many evaluation stakeholders, 
including key intended users, may judge 
evaluations on criteria that differ sharply from our 
professional standards and the criteria we 
commonly employ in meta-evaluations. 
This paper reflects on an evaluation carried 
out in 1996 for International Service for National 
Agricultural Research (the ISNAR evaluation). At 
the time, I worked for ISNAR as an evaluation 
specialist. ISNAR was affiliated with the CGIAR, a 
network of international agricultural research 
centers established in the 1970s to mobilize 
modern science to expand the production of basic 
foods in developing countries. The CGIAR is 
perhaps best known for its role in the Green 
Revolution, which, beginning in the 1960s, 
resulted in expanded use of high-yielding crop 
varieties, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides, and 
in rapid growth of food production in many 
developing regions (Conway, 1997; Cullather, 
2010).  
The CGIAR has an over-riding “hard-science” 
culture centered on crop and livestock 
improvement through the application of modern 
genetics and related applied sciences. Within the 
CGIAR, agricultural economists have conducted 
research studies that have supported program 
planning, resource allocation, and fundraising. 
Prominent among these studies have been 
economic impact assessments of the returns on 
research investments. In fact, in the international 
agricultural research community, impact 
assessment is generally thought of as a sub-
discipline of agricultural economics (Alston et al., 
1995).  
Whereas most CGIAR centers carry out 
technical research on crops, livestock and natural 
resources, ISNAR worked to strengthen national 
agricultural research organizations and systems. 
To this end, we carried out applied research on 
agricultural research policies, organization, and 
management and provided national organizations 
with advisory services and training. Since our 
activities focused on capacity development, when 
it came time to evaluate ISNAR’s impacts, we 
believed that program evaluation frameworks and 
methods were likely to be more appropriate and 
useful than traditional economic methods. I still 
believe we were right. But at the time, our 
experiment with program evaluation was a rather 




The CGIAR Secretariat, based at the World Bank, 
organized External Program and Management 
Reviews of each center about each five years. In 
preparation for an external review, each center 
was expected to assess its own achievements and 
impacts (CGIAR, 1995b, p. 11). Rather than do this 
as a “one-off” exercise, in 1996, we decided to 
conduct the ISNAR assessment as the first phase 
of a multi-year initiative to develop and test 
methods for evaluating organizational capacity 
development.  
At the time, impact assessment and evaluation 
were becoming “hot topics” in the CGIAR, which 
had entered a period of financial uncertainty and 
downsizing. In 1995, a high-level donor group 
requested that the CGIAR improve its governance 
and “strengthen the assessment of its performance 
and impact by establishing an independent 
evaluation function” (CGIAR, 1995a, p. 11). An 
Impact Assessment and Evaluation Group was 
established to foster evaluation as an integral part 
of CGIAR activities (Özgediz, 1998). One of the 
group’s founding members was Eleanor 
Chelimsky, a highly respected program evaluator 
who from 1980 to 1994 had directed the Program 
Evaluation and Methodology Division of the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, the largest 
evaluation unit in the world at the time. Chelimsky 
had also served as President of the American 
Evaluation Association. The Impact Assessment 
and Evaluation Group represented the first 
systematic attempt to introduce program 
evaluation into the CGIAR (Horton, 1998). 
ISNAR’s experimentation with program evaluation 
approaches fit well within this broader initiative.  
 
 








The ISNAR evaluation aimed to achieve three 
goals: 
 
1. Methodology development – to explore 
the use of methods for assessing 
organizational performance and impact, 
which ISNAR and others could use in the 
future. 
2. Learning and program improvement – to 
provide ISNAR with suggestions for 
improving its activities and performance 
in the future. 
3. Accountability – to provide an external 
review panel with an independent 
assessment of ISNAR achievements, 
impacts and constraints over the last five 
years. 
 
At the time, there was no consensus on the 
meaning and purpose of impact assessment in the 
CGIAR or in the broader fields of international 
development and program evaluation. Whereas 
Rossi & Freeman (1985, p.185) viewed the purpose 
of impact assessment as “establishing whether or 
not an intervention is producing its intended 
effects,” Schalock (1995, p. 13) focused on before-
and-after and with-and-without comparisons, 
seeing impact analysis as determining “whether 
the program made a difference compared to either 
no program or an alternative program.” A few 
years later, the Development Assistance 
Community of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development defined impacts 
broadly as relating to “positive and negative, 
primary and secondary long-term effects produced 
by a development intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended’ (DAC, 2002, p. 
24).  
 Within the CGIAR, most impact assessments 
examined the effects of new technologies produced 
by research programs on crop yields, incomes, or 
economic surplus – not on the effects of research 
programs on such ultimate or long-term goals as 
food security or poverty reduction. 
 For both substantive and methodological 
reasons, we decided to focus the ISNAR evaluation 




on client organizations, rather than on exploring 
their possible indirect or long-term effects on such 
distant goals as food security, poverty reduction or 
environmental sustainability. This was in line with 
work at the Evaluation Division of the 
International Development Research Centre that 
led to the “Outcome Mapping” approach (Earle et 




The ISNAR evaluation was collaborative, in that it 
was led by external evaluators and involved 
members of ISNAR at key points during the 
evaluation process. An external team of evaluators 
took ultimate responsibility for designing the 
evaluation, collecting much of the data, analyzing 
and interpreting the results, and reporting on the 
assessment. ISNAR staff members made 
substantive contributions to the evaluation design, 
assembled information on ISNAR activities and 
outputs, and commented on draft reports. This 
division of roles and responsibilities reflected 
ISNAR’s strategy of tapping external expertise in 
organizational assessment while building its own 
capacity in this area. 
 To enhance the quality, legitimacy and 
credibility of the evaluation, and to maximize 
ISNAR’s own learning and capacity development, 
we contracted a team of international experts in 
evaluation, organizational development, and 
agricultural research management, from the 
International Development Reserch Centre and 
Universalia Management Group in Canada and 
from national agricultural research organizations 
in Brazil and Ethiopia.3 
 At a June 1996 workshop, five external 
evaluators and ten ISNAR staff members 
developed an evaluation framework, formulated a 
list of evaluation questions, defined a set of 
																																																								
3	The	 team	was	 led	by	Ronald	Mackay,	professor	of	
education	 and	 evaluation	 specialist,	 Concordia	
University	 (Montreal,	 Canada).	 The	 other	 team	
members	were	Jairo	Borges-Andrade,	organizational	
psychologist	 and	 evaluator,	 Brazilian	 Corporation	
for	Agricultural	Research	 and	University	 of	Brasilia	
(Brasilia,	Brazil);	 	Seme	Debela,	plant	geneticist	and	
former	 Director	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 Institute	 of	
Agricultural	 Research	 (Addis	 Ababa,	 Ethiopia);	
Charles	 Lusthaus,	 specialist	 in	 organizational	
assessment	 and	 development,	 Universalia	
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evaluation studies, designed survey instruments, prepared detailed terms of reference for the  
 
Table 1. Evaluation Studies, Study Questions, Data Sources, and Data Collection Methods 
 
Evaluation study Key study question Data source Data collection 
method 










 Nature of data collected   
























2. Survey of 
agriculture 
leaders 
Data on ISNAR 
input into 10 
areas of 
management 
Data relating to 












3. Country case 
studies 
Data on activities, 
processes and 
procedures used 
by ISNAR to 
achieve results 
with NAROs 


























 Data on 
potential for 
reviews as a 
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external team, developed a budget for the 
evaluation, and prepared a schedule of the main 




To guide the evaluation, the evaluation team 
selected an organizational assessment framework 
developed by Universalia (Lusthaus et al., 1995), 
which views an organization’s performance as 
being influenced primarily by the external 
environment, organizational motivation, and 
organizational capacity. The framework included 
an inventory of the components or variables 
making up each of these four organizational 
dimensions.  
In terms of this model, ISNAR’s interventions 
could impact a client organization’s external 
environment, organizational motivation and 
capacity; and these in turn could influence the 
organization’s performance. However, ISNAR 
could not have a direct impact on a national 
agricultural research organization’s performance, 
on the subsequent effects on that organization’s 
clients (i.e. on farmers), on farm-level yields, or on 
broader economic, social or environmental 
impacts. For this reason, the evaluation studies 
described below focused on ISNAR’s activities, 
outputs and impacts on the environment, 
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motivation and capacity of national agricultural 
research organizations, as opposed to the 
performance of these organizations. ISNAR’s own 
operating environment, motivation and capacity 
were of interest insofar as they facilitated or 




To answer the question, “What have been ISNAR’s 
achievements, impacts and constraints over the 
previous five years?” (since the previous external), 
the evaluation team designed a set of five studies 
that tapped different sources of information and 
employed different data collection methods: 
 
1. A telephone survey of national agricultural 
leaders, to obtain structured perceptual 
data from a sample of ISNAR’s clients, on 
its achievements, impacts, and constraints. 
2. A telephone survey of ISNAR stakeholders 
– for example, officials in donor agencies 
and development agencies – to gauge its 
standing in the international community. 
3. Case studies of ISNAR’s work and results in 
agricultural research organizations in 
Uruguay, Kenya, and Morocco 
4. A meta-evaluation of ISNAR-commissioned 
evaluations and reviews, to assess the 
methods used and obtain evidence of 
impact 
5. Assessment of an inventory of ISNAR’s 
outputs, to provide the evaluation team 
with structured information on outputs in 
relation to ISNAR’s goals, areas of work, 
types of activities, and country / regional 
coverage 
 
Table 1 illustrates the relationships between the 
key evaluation questions, the data collection 





To encourage utilization of the evaluation results 
within ISNAR, managers and staff members were 
involved at key decision points during the 
evaluation. Involvement of the external review 
panel was more problematic. In July, the leader of 
the ISNAR evaluation team met with external 
review panel members during their initial visit to 
ISNAR, to discuss the evaluation plan. Later, all 
communications between the ISNAR evaluation 
team and the review panel were via the panel’s 
Secretary – an economist at the CGIAR Science 
Council based at the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations in Rome. Just 
before the main phase of the review in October 
1996 the role of panel Secretary shifted to another 
economist at the CGIAR Secretariat, based at the 
World Bank in Washington, DC. After that point, 
there was no communication between the ISNAR 




One limitation of the evaluation that we were 
aware of from the start was its heavy reliance on 
perceptual data. Within the time and budget 
available, and in the absence of baseline data and 
experimental treatments, the team attempted to 
compensate for the lack of “hard evidence” on 
performance and impacts by using interview 
techniques that assisted in memory recall and by 





Both the type of results presented in the ISNAR 
evaluation and the form of presentation differed 
sharply from those found in most CGIAR impact 
assessments. The leading textbook on agricultural 
research evaluation focuses on “contributions of 
research to economic efficiency and the 
distribution of benefits [which] can be measured 
as the net present value of research–induced 
changes in economic surplus” (Alston et al., 1995. 
p. 502). The most comprehensive and 
authoritative meta-analysis of agricultural 
research impact assessments examines 1,886 rates 
of return on agricultural research investments 
reported in 292 publications (Alston et al., 2000). 
In contrast to these quantitative studies, the 
ISNAR evaluation was discursive, examining links 
between ISNAR strategies, activities, products and 
services delivered, use of ISNAR outputs by 
national agricultural research organizations, and 
the changes in organizational motivation and 
capacities reported by key informants and survey 
respondents. The evaluation results were 
summarized in text, a series of tables, and 12 main 
findings. Results were illustrated with quotations 
from interviewees and survey respondents.  
The ISNAR evaluation panel presented a 35-page 
summary report with sections on achievements, 
impacts and constraints faced by ISNAR, 
supplemented with background documents on the 
evaluation methodology; results of the surveys of 
ISNAR stakeholders and agricultural research 
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leaders in developing countries; case-study reports 
on impacts in Kenya, Morocco, and Uruguay; and 
results of a meta-evaluation of ISNAR reviews. The 
evaluators avoided high-level impact claims, 
noting that, 
“There is a long and complex series of 
causal linkages, involving many different 
actors and a multiplicity of inputs, 
between ISNAR activities at one extreme 
and performance [of national agricultural 
research organizations] at the other. 
Between the two extremes there is a 
dynamic chain of achievement–impact 
relationships, for which reliability and 
predictability diminish with each 
successive link beyond the ISNAR 
intervention. In evaluating ISNAR’s 
impacts it is prudent, therefore, to focus 
on the primary impacts, i.e. the outcomes 
and results as identified, observed, or 
reported in the surveys and case studies” 
(Mackay et al., 1998, p. 18).  
 
The central findings of the report were 
summarized as follows:  
 
“ISNAR has an important role to play in 
strengthening the management of 
agricultural research internationally. 
ISNAR carries out its role with vigor, 
resulting in a high level of client 
satisfaction and significant impacts on 
NARS and their constituent organizations. 
ISNAR has earned a good reputation for 
itself in the process” (Mackay et al., 1998 
p. 28). 
 
The evaluation report identified areas in which 
ISNAR work had contributed most to 
organizational motivation and capacity, vis-à-
visother areas where contributions were smaller or 
even negative. The evaluation concluded that 
ISNAR had greatest impacts in the areas of 
agricultural research policy, planning and inter-
organizational linkages; intermediate impacts on 
management of personnel and research-programs; 
and much smaller impacts on organizational 
structure and governance, organizational culture 
and financial management (Mackay et al., 1998, 
pp. 22-24). It also noted that “the lack of a clear 
theory of action that explicitly identifies the 
connections between its goals and objectives, and 
the actions and resources it employs to achieve 
these, limits ISNAR’s performance as a learning 








One of the first major activities of the new Impact 
Assessment and Evaluation Group was to 
commission a methodological review and 
synthesis of existing CGIAR ex post impact 
assessments. An experienced program evaluator, 
Leslie Cooksy, was contracted to lead the meta-
evaluation. Cooksy was a highly respected program 
evaluator who had worked with Chelimsky at GAO, 
and served as president of the American 
Evaluation Association in 2010.  
 The purpose of the review was to describe the 
strengths and weaknesses of past evaluation 
efforts and determine whether the existing body of 
evidence on center effectiveness could be 
synthesized to assess overall effects of the CGIAR 
(Cooksy, 1997a). The documents reviewed were 
identified through a preliminary assessment of 
studies sent by Centers in response to a request to 
submit ex post evaluation studies conducted from 
1980 – 1996. Of the 265 documents sent by the 
Centers, only 87 that presented evidence on center 
effects were reviewed.  
 The other 178 studies were excluded because 
they presented methods for impact evaluation 
without describing the results of a specific 
evaluation; described Center activities or made 
claims of effects without presenting evidence on 
effects; presented methods or results for research 
planning (ex-ante evaluation) rather than 
providing information on the effects of Center 
activities (ex-post assessment); projected future 
effects with minimal discussion of current or past 
trends; or failed to present a clear link between 
reported effects and Center activities.  
 The meta-evaluation report noted that a major 
limitation of the review was the selection process 
(Cooksy, 1997a, pp. 1-2). Each Center made its 
own submissions, apparently using different 
decision rules, even though each responded to the 
same request letter. This may have led to the 
observed variety of type and number of documents 
submitted by different Centers. As a result, Cooksy 
cautioned that generalizations about the 
evaluation efforts of the Centers should be made 
with caution. Despite these selection issues, the 
meta-evaluation team felt that a number of useful 
lessons could be drawn from the exercise. Based 
on the review of the selected 87 documents, the 
meta-evaluation concluded that  
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“The Centers have a wealth of information 
on their activities, the products of those 
activities, and the uptake and use of those 
products. However, the documents 
reviewed for this project indicate that less 
information is available on some of the 
intermediate and longer-range outcomes 
of the Centers’ activities. In addition, the 
credibility of the linkages between Center 
activities and the outcomes reported in the 
documents is often difficult to assess 
because of insufficient information on 
methodology and alternative explanations 
for observed effects. For this reason, a 
synthesis of evidence on effects across the 
documents is not defensible” (Cooksy, 
1997a, p. 4). 
 
The meta-evaluation team selected 11 studies for a 
more in-depth review, including the ISNAR 
evaluation, because they had been explicitly 
designed to evaluate the effects of center activities 
(rather than, for example, the effects of a specific 
new technology) and were broad in scope, in 
geographic or substantive terms.  
 The purpose of the in-depth review was to 
“identify methodological approaches that yielded 
credible claims of outcomes, and compile those 
claims that met a high standard of plausibility to 
learn what could be said with confidence about 
Center effects in general” (Cooksy, 1997b, p. ES-1). 
The study did not synthesize the 11 evaluation 
reports, because: “not all the claims made in the 
evaluation reports met high standards of 
plausibility” (Cooksy, 1997b, p. ES-4). The overall 
conclusion was that  
 
“after careful review of the 11 documents, 
we still know very little about the degree to 
which the CGIAR is achieving its mission 
of food security and sustainable 
agriculture in developing countries” 
(Cooksy, 1997b, Section 4, p. 6).  
 
The report identified 4 promising approaches to 
developing credible evidence that were modeled by 
at least one of the evaluations: (1) clear description 
and rationale for the sampling of cases, 
respondents, or documents reviewed; (2) synthesis 
of evidence across multiple sources; (3) disclosure 
of data gaps and limitations and cautious 
reporting when faced with severe data gaps and 
limitations; and (4) use of a logical framework to 
organize the information presented (Cooksy, 
1997b, Section 3, pp. 9-10). 
 In assessing the ISNAR evaluation, the meta-
evaluation report noted that 
“ISNAR’s report uses multiple sources of 
data (surveys, multiple case studies, and 
syntheses of past evaluation reports) to 
document its achievements during the 
period 1991-1996. The strengths of this 
report include its clear discussion of 
limitations of the data obtained (such as 
nonresponse in the surveys) and the use of 
an external evaluation team. In addition, 
the evidence from the different sources is 
presented in the context of ISNAR’s 
activities so that logical connections from 
activities to products to use can be made” 
(Cooksy, 1997b, Section 3, p. 5).  
 
According to the meta-evaluation report, while five 
of the eleven studies made claims about the 
institutional uptake and use of products, only 
three of them made plausible claims. The ISNAR 
evaluation was considered the most successful in 
supporting its claims: 
 
“ISNAR is most successful in supporting a 
range of claims… Not only does it support 
claims of public awareness of its products, 
it is the only one of the three centers that 
presents plausible evidence that its 
recommendations (specifically its 
approach to planning and priority setting) 
have been adopted. Note that ISNAR also 
measured customer satisfaction, which, 
while not necessarily linked to 
effectiveness, can be an indicator of the 






The external review panel had little use for the 
ISNAR evaluation. While noting several strengths 
of the evaluation,4 it identified key weaknesses in 
																																																								
4	The	 review	 report	 noted	 the	 following	 virtues	 of	
the	 ISNR	 evaluation:	 The	 evaluation	 report	
contained	 valuable	 information	 on	 ISNAR	 outputs	
and	 on	 the	 perceptions	 of	 NARS	 leaders	 and	
stakeholders	 regarding	 ISNAR’s	 activities	 and	
reputation;	 the	 externality	 of	 the	 study	 team	
members	 contributed	 to	 the	 objectivity	 of	 the	
report;	 the	 data-gathering	 effort	 was	 based	 on	 an	
organizational	 assessment	 framework;	 the	
interviews	 were	 conducted	 professionally;	 and	 the	
surveys	 provided	 useful	 information	 on	 client	 and	
stakeholder	views	on	ISNAR’s	work.	
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the methodological approach related to the 
measurement of the ISNAR-related interventions, 
the measurement of changes in organizational 
performance, and attribution of changes in 
performance to the ISNAR intervention. The 
performance indicators used in the surveys were 
viewed as “necessarily all subjective, given the 
methodology.” Moreover, “the methodology used 
did not allow control of factors other than the 
ISNAR intervention influencing [national 
agricultural research organizations’] 
performance.” (TAC Secretariat 1997, p. 18). The 
panel concluded that the study was “an experiment 
in assessing organizational performance and one 
that should be used as a stepping stone for 
building, in due course, more rigorous tools for 
institutional evaluation.” The panel urged ISNAR 
“to insist on greater methodological rigor” in 
future work in this area (TAC Secretariat 1997, p. 
18). During the main phase of the review, the 
panel secretary mentioned that he suspected the 





Jock Anderson, a senior agricultural economist in 
the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation 
Department (now Independent Evaluation Group) 
with extensive experience evaluating impacts of 
international agricultural research, was invited to 
comment on the Cooksy meta-evaluation study at 
the annual meeting of the CGIAR in October 1997. 
Anderson, who had led a comprehensive 
assessment of the CGIAR’s achievements and 
impacts in the mid-1980s (Anderson et al., 1988), 
opened his comments with a clear statement of 
concern: “It is good for evaluators to be ‘lean and 
mean,’ but when they are only mean, one can be 
justifiably concerned” (Anderson, 1997, p.1). He 
expressed special concern for the sampling 
procedures used in the meta-evaluation, noting 
that few of the background studies and none of the 
main reports prepared for the mid-1980s system-
wide impact assessment were included in the 
meta-evaluation.  
 
“It is apparent that the process 
engaged in did not meet the test of 
unbiased sampling (in this case, of the 
global literature) that is recommended as 
good practice in judging the acceptability 
of impact evidence… One aspect of the 
non-inclusion of the mid-1980s Impact 
Study that is especially galling, at least to 
me, relates not to rejection but to non-
consideration at all. A constant theme in 
Reports 1 and 2 is a quest for meta-
evaluation across the system within a 
consistent framework … The previous 
Impact Study [Anderson, Herdt and 
Scobie, 1988] did this explicitly across the 
whole System” (Anderson, 1997, p. 3).  
 
 Concerning the in-depth analysis of 11 impact 
studies, Anderson was highly critical: 
 
“The report is long on statements 
about plausibility (or, more precisely, lack 
of it!) in the appreciation of Center 
documents on impact. The subjectivity 
inherent in these types of comments is 
great, as it is necessarily now also in my 
mentioning that I find most of the analysis 
in this report to be quite implausible and 
thus not very useful in itself. If such 
critical works help to give us cause for 
pause, and to think more carefully and 
cogently about the persuasiveness of 
evidence of different types, perhaps some 
good will have been achieved, but that 
proposition remains to be tested.” 
(Anderson, 1997, p. 4) 
 
 In light of this highly critical assessment, the 
results of the meta-evaluation were never formally 
issued by the CGIAR or published elsewhere.5  
In the same presentation, Anderson also 
criticized another evaluation study, on factors 
affecting adoption and impacts of CGIAR 
innovations, led by the well-known program 
evaluator Lee Sechrest (1991 president of the 
American Evaluation Association):   
“I would hope that we might hear 
from some of the Centers here what they 
think of this work, which does not impress 
me as having significantly advanced the 
research agenda over that in many earlier 
Center studies of such phenomena, and 
has none of the broad, fresh thinking 
outlined in other contemporary 
contemplations of such matters … Let me 
make clear that I see nothing but good 
coming from fresh approaches to impact 
investigation, making greater use of 
procedures developed in the evaluation 
community, but let’s do our homework 
and get it right before squandering too 
																																																								
5 	The	 methods	 employed	 in	 the	 meta-evaluation	
were	 published	 in	 the	 American	 Journal	 of	
Evaluation	(Cooksy	and	Caracelli,	2005).	
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many scarce resources in the name of 
better evaluation” (Anderson, 1997, pp. 4-
5). 
 
Thus, the first 2 major studies carried out by 
experienced and respected program evaluators 
were roundly and publically criticized – essentially 
given failing marks – by one of leading authorities 





After its initial trials and tribulations, the Impact 
Assessment and Evaluation Group was disbanded, 
bringing to a close this first system-wide 
experiment with program evaluation. In its place, 
a Standing Panel on Impact Assessment was 
established to “provide CGIAR members with 
credible information about the impact of past 
CGIAR research centre investments and to 
enhance and systematize more the quality of 
ongoing CGIAR centre ex post impact assessment 
efforts” (Kelly et al. 2008, p. 202). A parallel 
Standing Panel on Monitoring and Evaluation was 
also established mainly to coordinated external 
reviews of centers. Since its establishment, the 
impact assessment panel has been led by 
agricultural economists who are considered 
leaders in the field of impact assessment. Over the 
years, this panel has supported methodological 
development and organized numerous impact 
assessment studies, results of which have been 
published in books and professional journal 
articles. In contrast, the monitoring and evaluation 
panel was chaired by research managers without 
professional standing in the field of program 
evaluation, and it had no similar record of 
methodological advances or evaluation studies. In 
a recent reorganization of the CGIAR, the 
monitoring and evaluation panel was disbanded, 
but the impact assessment panel continues to 
operate as a key component of the Independent 
Science and Partnership Council of the CGIAR 
(http://impact.cgiar.org).  
One of the first activities of the impact 
assessment panel was to commission Prabhu 
Pingali, Director of the Economics Program at the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center to prepare a study of “milestones in impact 
assessment research” (Pingali, 2001). Pingali’s 
study covered only research on the impacts of new 
technologies and agronomic management 
practices, excluding the contributions of CGIAR 
scientists to impact assessment research related to 
policy research and advice and capacity 
strengthening. The rationale for this exclusion was 
that these areas had received inadequate attention 
by evaluators (Pingali, 2001, p.1). Pingali’s review 
concluded that  
 
“Over the past three decades, CGIAR 
economists have been actively involved in 
assessing the adoption and impact of MVs 
[modern varieties] and other technologies 
developed by the CGIAR Centers. Impact 
assessment at the CGIAR has been 
recognized for its substantive and 
methodological contributions by the 
economics profession as well as by the 
donor community that invests in the 
CGIAR centers… Numerous high-quality 
publications in international journals, as 
well as numerous awards received by 
CGIAR researchers, attest to the high 
quality of the [impact assessment] 
research conducted at the centers” 
(Pingali, 2001, pp. 12-13). 
 
Neither the ISNAR evaluation nor the meta-
evaluation of CGIAR impact assessments was 




The ISNAR evaluation and the meta-evaluation of 
CGIAR impact assessments suggest three broad 





There are no universal criteria or standards for 
judging an evaluation. Program evaluators have 
formulated useful principles and norms to guide 
our work. But at the end of the day, stakeholders 
may look at our evaluations through very different 
lenses and judge them on the basis of criteria and 
standards that differ sharply from those of the 
program evaluation community.  
In an assessment of the effectiveness of 
knowledge systems for sustainable development, 
Cash et al. (2003) note that scientific information 
is likely to influence debates to the extent that the 
information is perceived by relevant stakeholders 
to be credible, salient, and legitimate. In this 
context, credibility involves the “scientific 
adequacy of the technical evidence and 
arguments;” salience refers to the “relevance of the 
assessment to the needs of decision makers;” and 
legitimacy “reflects the perception that the 
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production of information has been … unbiased in 
its conduct” (Cash et al., 2003, p. 8087). The same 
authors emphasize the importance of “boundary 
work” to facilitate communication, translation, 
and mediation across the boundaries between 
experts and decision makers.  
These principles can be usefully extrapolated 
to the field of evaluation. In both the ISNAR 
evaluation and the meta-evaluation of CGIAR 
impact assessments, boundary work was 
inadequate. Relevant stakeholders questioned the 
scientific adequacy of the methods employed and 
felt the studies were biased. One implication is 
that to encourage understanding and a favorable 
perception of an evaluation, evaluators should 
engage key stakeholders to the extent possible 
throughout the evaluation process. Evaluators will 
recognize this as a basic principle of utilization-





In a classic article, Haas (1992, p. 3) defines an 
epistemic community as “a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue area.” In the field of 
international agricultural research, agricultural 
economists form such a community. They fought 
long and hard to gain acceptance and authority in 
policy discussions in the hard-science culture of 
the CGIAR, and have proven highly effective in 
that sphere. Conducting impact assessments has 
been central to gaining acceptance and authority. 
Ex-ante assessments have contributed to priority 
setting and resource allocation within the CGIAR, 
and ex-post assessments that have shown high 
returns on investments in agricultural research, 
have helping justify funding for CGIAR centers. 
Over the years, agricultural economists have risen 
to many of the senior-most positions in 
agricultural research management and 
governance. The location of the CGIAR Secretariat 
(more recently Fund Council) at the World Bank 
has further cemented the power and prominence 
of economists in the CGIAR. As can be imagined, 
they are not about to cede ground in the evaluation 




The ISNAR evaluation was by no means 
perfect. But it is unlikely that any attempt to assess 
ISNAR’s impacts would have been viewed as 
“exemplary” in the CGIAR. One reason was that 
impact assessment was considered a branch of 
agricultural economics. So even though the 
methods employed by agricultural economists 
were inadequate for evaluating capacity 
development and institutional strengthening, an 
impact assessment that employed other methods –
such as those associated with program evaluation 
– was bound to fail on methodological grounds. It 
simply would not be considered a “real” or 
“legitimate” impact assessment.  
A second reason was that ISNAR itself was 
always controversial. In a system where most 
centers were dedicated to scientific research and 
the generation of new farming technologies, 
ISNAR was a poor fit.  Throughout its existence, 
controversy surrounded ISNAR’s mission and its 
role in international agricultural research. These 
controversies only ended when ISNAR was closed 
in 2004. Since that date, the CGIAR has had no 
concerted effort to strengthen national agricultural 
research or agricultural innovation systems in the 




While these early efforts produced few positive 
results in the short term, over time, numerous 
developments have led to greater convergence on 
what is considered “exemplary” evaluation in the 
CGIAR. Several program evaluators, including 
Frans Leeuw, John Mayne, Elliott Stern, and 
Leslie Cooksy have been involved in evaluation 
activities, at the level of CGIAR programs and also 
at the system governance level. An “Institutional 
Learning and Change Initiative” established in 
2004 spearheaded the use of learning-orientated 
evaluation in the CGIAR for a decade.6 In 2008, 
the CGIAR issued guidelines for ex post impact 
assessment that included several program 
evaluation approaches (Walker et al., 2008). Use 
of theory of change has been introduced into 
planning and evaluation procedures for CGIAR 
global programs. Most important of all, in 2012 at 
the request of its major donors, the CGIAR 
prepared an evaluation policy and established an 
Independent Evaluation Arrangement 
(http://iea.cgiar.org) modeled on similar 
evaluation groups in the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, the World 
Bank and other international agencies.  
 
																																																								
6 	Impetus	 for	 establishing	 “Better	 Evaluation”	
(http://betterevaluation.org)	 emerged	 from	 an	
ILAC-sponsored	workshop	in	2008.		





This paper has reflected on early experiences with 
program evaluation in an international network of 
research centers in the 1990s. It illustrates how 
different stakeholder groups representing different 
disciplines and epistemic communities can have 
sharply differing perceptions of the quality and 
usefulness of an evaluation. What one group 
considers exemplary, other groups may consider 
suspect, methodologically weak, or biased. While 
the early efforts with program evaluation analyzed 
here were experienced as failures, a number of 
subsequent developments have led to greater 
understanding of diverse evaluation approaches, 
and some movement toward agreement on what 
constitutes exemplary evaluation in the CGIAR. 
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